首页基地简介研究队伍学术成果学术交流人才培养出版刊物资料信息
当前位置: 首页>>通知通告>>正文
小鸟读书会第三十九期:俄罗斯精英联盟与政治稳定
2019-04-15 09:19  

论文题目: Reuter, Ora John,& Szakonyi, David. Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia. American Political Science Review, 1-17. doi:10.1017/S0003055419000030.

主持:李永涛博士

主讲:陈雪,国际关系学院,研究生一年级

时间:2019年04月16日,星期二,17:30-19:30

地点:蒲河校区则行楼417会议室 

论文摘要

Elite cohesion is one of the fundamental pillars of authoritarian regime stability. Defections from the ruling coalition can signal regime weakness, embolden the opposition, and, sometimes, lead to regime collapse. Using a unique dataset on 4,313 regional legislative candidates from Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, this paper examines the determinants of elite defections in one prominent electoral autocracy. We believe this to be the first study to use quantitative, micro-level data to test hypotheses about the integrity of elite coalitions under autocracy. Our theoretical framework predicts that elites will be more likely to defect when there is increased uncertainty about the willingness and/or ability of the regime to provide electoral benefits, spoils, and career advancement. Regimes that limit points of access to spoils, share power with the opposition, and lack strong formal institutions see higher rates of defection. While opposition co-optation may help the regime assuage threats from outside the regime, it may also leave regime insiders disgruntled and prone to defect. Finally, elites with personal followings and private business connections are most likely to defect, since they are better equipped to pursue their political goals independently of the regime. This result suggests that allowing elites to accumulate autonomous resources can undermine an authoritarian regime’s hold on power.


关闭窗口
中国 沈阳 辽宁大学转型国家经济政治研究中心 2016 版权所有
Copyright Research Center for the Economies and Politics of Transitional Countries (RCEPTC),Liaoning University All Rights Reserved
地址:沈阳市沈北新区道义南大街58号 邮编:110136 电话:0086-24-62602445 传真:0086-24-62602447 邮箱:rceptc@lnu.edu.cn