论文题目：Jasper Cooper, 2018. How Political Competition Can Increase Corruption: Electoral cycles in police extortion in West Africa. Working Paper.
Several studies have found a positive association between democratization and corruption. Few, however, posit a convincing mechanism. I explain why the relationship between political competition and corruption may be concave. In countries where bureaucracies are poorly insulated from political influence, the introduction of elections increases uncertainty about future leadership. By threatening future income, competitive elections raise the opportunity cost of remaining honest, incentivizing corruption. These dynamics do not exist in autocratic countries,where elections provoke no uncertainty about future leadership, or in consolidated democracies, where civil service legislation protects bureaucrats from political vicissitudes. Examining electoral cycles in over 300,000 bribes paid over a seven-year period by truck-drivers in five West African countries, I show that the average bribe extorted by bureaucrats increases by twenty three percent in the buildup to competitive elections. Consistent with the idea that political competition only increases extortion when it increases uncertainty, bribes in the post-election period return to the non-electoral average when incumbents win reelection, but remain high when challengers win. I find no evidence that such dynamics exist around elections in autocracies. The findings suggest that democratization can have adverse effects on corruption in the short-term, and highlight the importance of civil service insulation as an anti-corruption policy.